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We ﬁnd a limited parallel between lump-sum taxes and environmental taxes.
Corollary 2, which extends Sandmo’s observation, shows that appropriated corrective
revenues have the same non-distortionary eﬀects as lump-sum taxes, the result reducing
to the original observation when the appropriated corrective revenues meet the revenue
need and achieve ﬁrst-best eﬃciency with other taxes set at zero.
Corollary 1 ﬁnds that when the corrective part of environmental taxes is used as
marginal damage compensation, the non-corrective part is distortionary and symmetric
with ordinary proportional labor taxes in second-best equilibria.
The extension of Sandmo’s observation suggests that environmental taxes may
be among the least distortionary taxes in the tax system.
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Almost 30 years ago Sandmo (1975, p. 94) observed that environmental taxes
achieved ﬁrst-best eﬃciency (and thus are non-distortionary) when they are set at
their corrective Pigovian levels, if their revenues meet the government’s revenue need
and other taxes are set at zero. Similarly, lump-sum taxes achieve ﬁrst-best eﬃciency
(and are non-distortionary) when they are large enough to meet the revenue need with
other taxes set at zero. Moreover, it seems plausible that when revenues from corrective
taxes are less than but close to the revenue need, the tax system might come close to
ﬁrst-best eﬃciency, in a similar way to when lump-sum taxes are less than but close
to meeting the revenue need the tax system comes close to ﬁrst-best eﬃciency.
With these observations in mind, we ask the question: “To what extent is there a
parallel between environmental taxes and lump-sum taxes?” A parallel of course would
be limited. Environmental taxes (more precisely externality taxes2) are designed to
change the behavior of producers of environmental harms while lump-sum taxes do
not have marginal incentive eﬀects, except from wealth eﬀects.
We ﬁnd a limited parallel. A deﬁning diﬀerence between environmental and other
taxes is that the former have a corrective Pigovian part, while the latter do not. But
environmental taxes may also have a non-corrective part when they are set higher or
lower than at their corrective levels. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show that the non-
corrective part of environmental taxes is distortionary, behaving symmetrically with
a proportional labor tax when the corrective revenues are used as marginal damage
compensation to recipients of environmental harms. In this case we ﬁnd the whole
environmental tax is typically higher than its ﬁrst-best Pigovian level.
But in a parallel, Theorem 3identiﬁes an equivalence relation between corrective
Pigovian revenues of environmental taxes and lump-sum taxes. Corollary 3conﬁrms
2It has become a common usage to analyze externality taxes under the heading of environmental
taxes, and we follow that usage here, except sometimes when the deﬁning properties of externalities
are being highlighted.
1the intuition that when appropriated Pigovian revenues come close to meeting the
revenue need, the second-best tax system comes close to ﬁrst-best eﬃciency. Corollary
2 extends Sandmo’s observation by showing that, whether or not there are other taxes,
appropriated corrective revenues are non-distortionary sources of general revenue in the
same way that lump-sum taxes are non-distortionary sources; and when appropriated
corrective revenues equal the revenue need, the second-best tax-system is ﬁrst-best.
The above results apply to ordinary proportional taxes but only vacuously because
the corrective levels of ordinary proportional taxes are zero and the corrective parts of
ordinary taxes generate no revenues.
Other papers have found non-distortionary properties of environmental taxes.
Kaplow (1996) showed that in the presence of distortionary taxes, taxes based on
marginal beneﬁts can in principle ﬁnance public goods without additional distortionary
costs, and he applied this idea to environmental taxes, which produce the public good
of environmental quality. Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) found that environmental taxes
and other forms of regulation can create rents, which when taxed away lower the
distortionary cost of the tax system, compared with forms of regulation that leave the
rents with the producers. Both papers are related to ours, but neither addresses the
extension of Sandmo’s observation or the parallel with lump-sum taxes.
Our results are consistent with Bovenberg and de Mooij(1994), Oates (1994),
Fullerton (1997), and Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) in their conclusions that in a
second-best equilibrium marginal beneﬁts of environmental taxes are oﬀset by marginal
costs elsewhere. But the extension of Sandmo’s observation appears to be contrary to
the conclusion by Bovenberg and de Mooij (p. 916, 1997) that environmental taxes
“tend to be more, rather than less, distortionary than other taxes.”
The potential revenue from corrective Pigovian taxes is large, perhaps in the
hundreds of billions annually,3 and thus it appears that environmental taxes (and
3Consider just a few examples from the environmental damage assessment literature. The EPA’s
central estimate for the beneﬁts of the Clean Air Act for the year 2000 is $71 billion (Environmental
2auctioned marketable allowances) could be among the least distortionary sources of
revenue in the tax system. At the same time, the parallel with lump-sum taxes suggests
that greater attention be paid to distributional eﬀects of environmental harms even in
the case of non-regulation, where Theorem 3also applies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I summarizes ﬁrst-order conditions for
a simple case without externalities. Section II extends these observations to include
externalities and derives the main results. Section III discusses tax interaction eﬀects.
Section IV is on policy.
I. The Baseline Case of Proportional Taxes without Environmental Harms
Consider the model (1) - (6) below, without externalities, where each individual i
consumes xi of the private good, z of the public good and supplies Li units of labor. The
private good x is produced with labor and capital and the public good z is produced
with labor alone. Each i is endowed with K units of capital (corn), which can either
be consumed directly or supplied as a factor in producing x. We will ﬁnd a symmetry
between this simple model and a model with externalities.
Protection Agency, p. iii, 1999). Shrank and Lomax (2001) estimated $78 billion annual costs from
wasted time and gasoline due to highway congestion (the estimate excludes costs of increased air
pollution, costs of increased maintenence and capacity; the $78 billion estimate is for 68 urbanized
areas which include about 75% of the urbanized areas in the US). Porter (1999) estimated an annual
external cost from automobile air pollution of $27 billion, $60 billion from non-driver fatalities (p.
194), and cites the $90 billion annual cost of road administration, maintenance and capital outlay,
much of which is externally borne cost, including the wear and tear from trucks from their heavy
axle loadings (p. 161). Porter cites 9 other studies with estimates of external costs of driving in the
range of $500 billion to $1 trillion annually (p. 194). Newman and Kenworthy (1999, p. 56) list
5 studies for the US and 3 for other countries (with some overlap with Porter’s citations). These
estimates range from about $400 to 800 billion in annual external costs for the US. Vickrey estimated
the congestion cost of cars in Manhattan to be about $15 per car per trip into the island (personal
communication). H. Uzawa (1974, p. 98) estimated the external cost of driving to be in the range of
$3000 to $4000 in current dollar values per car per year, comparable to other estimates. The IPCC
oﬀers a range of estimates of a carbon tax to internalize environmental costs of climate change. The
estimates range from $10 to $100 per ton, which translates for an annual 6 billion tons emissions
worldwide with roughly 1.25 billion tons of US emissions to a possibly appropriable Pigovian revenue
in a range of $12.5 to $125 billion for the US. Most of these estimates are based on average damages.
Converting to marginal damages, appropriate for an estimate of the Pigovian revenue, would tend to
increase estimates of Pigovian revenues. In the other direction, only a portion of Pigovian revenues
are collectable and available as a tax revenue source.
3(1) Ui(xi,z,L i,K − Ki) Quasi-concave utility for individual i,i n c r e a s i n gi n
xi and z and decreasing in Li and Ki
(2) x = f(Lx,K x) Production function for the private good x
(3) z = h(Lz) Production function for the public good z
where we assume constant returns to scale (CRS) in production and a representative
agent form of utilities with Ui(·)=U(·). Besides the market clearing equations, the
Walrasian equilibrium conditions come from:
(4) Max U(xi,z,L i,K −Ki) subject to Pxxi = wLi + rKi − Mi (each i)
xi,L i,K i
(5) Max Pxf(Lx,K x) − (w + v)Lx − (r + γ)Kx
Lx,K x
(6) wLz = γK + vLx + M
where in the consumers’ maximization problem (4), Px is the price of x, labor is the
numeraire good with wage w =1 ,r is the rental rate of captial, and Mi is the lump-sum
tax on i (a ﬁxed tax possibly constrained to zero). In the x-industry’s problem (5),
v and γ are proportional taxes on labor and capital respectively. In the government’s
budget constraint (6), expenditures wLz on z equal revenue sources from capital, labor
and total lump-sum taxes M =

Mi. Labor producing the public good is untaxed.4










∂Li), the sum of the marginal beneﬁts of z as ˆ p =

i ˆ pi (where ˆ p is
the aggregate Lindahl price), and the net social beneﬁt NSB as

i Ui. To reduce
Kuhn-Tucker analysis we consider only internal equilibria where the non-negativity
constraints Li,K i,x,z≥ 0 are not binding.
Observation 1 says that in a Walrasian equilibrium, with incremental changes in
taxes, the change in the normalized NSB equals the change in the net beneﬁt of the
public good minus the change in the distortionary costs of the taxes.
4As a background assumption, for the Walrasian equilibrium to be an appropriate solution concept,
we assume xi is a small fraction of x, and there are many small ﬁrms.
4Observation 1. First-order conditions for a Walrasian equilibrium for taxes







(ˆ phL − 1)dLz +








Proof. Condition (8) follows from taking the diﬀerential of the budget constraint
(6) and recalling that w = 1. See the Appendix for (7).
In (7), ˆ phL,w h e r ehL =
∂h
∂Lz, is the value of the marginal product of a unit of
labor in producing z, valued in units of labor, and 1 is the marginal resource cost of
labor in units of labor, so (ˆ phL − 1) is the marginal net beneﬁt of the public good
ﬁnanced by taxes. The terms γdKx and vdLx are diﬀerential distortionary beneﬁts or
the negative of the marginal distortionary costs of taxes γ and v.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 shows own-price and cross-price distortionary eﬀects as increments of
Harberger triangles for dγ > 0w i t hv and M ﬁxed. In panel (i), dγ > 0 decreases de-
mand for capital by dKx with an increase in the own-price distortionary cost of −γdKx.
In panel (ii)w i t hdγ > 0a n dKx declining, the marginal product of labor declines (by
Wicksell’s Law), demand for labor declines by dLx, with cross-price distortionary cost
of −vdLx.
In a second-best equilibrium, changes in γ and v,w i t hﬁ x e dM, must not increase
the net social beneﬁt, and setting d(NSB) = 0, we get from Observation 1:





=( ˆ phL −1)dLz +γdKx +vdLx =0 and dLz = d(γKx)+d(vLx),
5where the condition on the right side is (8) with dM =0 .
The idea of Observation 2 is that in a second-best equilibrium, the marginal net
beneﬁt of the public good, (ˆ phL −1)dLz, equals the sum of the marginal distortionary
costs of the taxes used to ﬁnance it. Alternatively, the observation can be interpreted to
say that in a second-best equilibrium the marginal cost of raising an extra $1 in public
funds must equal the marginal beneﬁt of the public good ﬁnanced by this dollar.5
Observations 1 and 2 satisfy a permutation symmetry. Exchanging v and γ
and exchanging Lx and Kx leave the form of the ﬁrst-order conditions the same in
the two observations. The symmetry in ﬁrst-order conditions is not surprising, given
the symmetry of the model itself. The taxes γ and v are Ramsey taxes and typically
positive, although one can be negative (but not both) when there are suﬃciently strong
complementarities built into the production and/or utility functions.
Next consider the ﬁrst-order conditions for the lump-sum tax M. Write λ1 for
the shadow price of the upperbound constraint M and V
I M(M) for the value function
associated with the envelope theorem.
Observation 3. First-order conditions for second-best M are




Condition (10) is the slack complementarity condition for the upperbound con-
straint M and (11) says that the value function is the shadow price of M.W h e nλ1 > 0
and the upperbound constraint M is strictly binding, we will say there is a revenue
need (and we also identify λ1 = 0 as a necessary condition of ﬁrst-best eﬃciency). It
follows from (10) that when there is a revenue need and the upperbound constraint M
5To see this, rearrange (9) to ˆ phL =1−(γdK+vdLx), where incremental changes in the taxes are
chosen to satisfy the budget constraint with dLz = 1. Recalling that w = 1, the incremental increase
in public funds is $1. The marginal beneﬁt of the increase dLz =1i sˆ phL. The marginal cost of the
extra $1 is the increase in distortionary cost −(γdK + vdLx) plus the 1 unit of labor drawn from the
private sector to produce the public good.
6is relaxed, the second-best M increases, and by condition (11) NSB increases.
With the constraint of revenue neutrality, the government’s budget is held at
constant G.T h e n dG = dLz = 0 and (7) becomes
d(NSB)
−UL = γdKx + vdLx.I n o t h e r
words, in a Walrasian equilibrium with revenue neutrality, when distortionary costs
decrease incrementally, the normalized NSB increases by the same amount. And when
dLz = 0 from revenue neutrality, γdKx + vdLx = 0 from (9). Thus in a second-best
equilibrium, if we make incremental changes in taxes γ and v in a way that preserves
revenue neutrality, then the sum of the distortionary tax interaction eﬀects must add
to zero. This means, for example, that in a second-best equilibrium with revenue
neutrality, if an incremental change in γ decreases its own-price distortionary cost,
then the change “exacerbates” the distortionary costs of the sum of the other three
own-price and cross-price distortionary tax interaction eﬀects.
Next we modify and extend model (1) - (6) to take into account externalities.
II. Distortionary and Non-Distortionary Properties of Environmental Taxes
There are two main diﬀerences between negative externalities and ordinary pri-
vate goods: negative externalties impose involuntarily borne costs and these costs may
be borne by many people simultaneously. Taking these diﬀerences into account leads
to model (1 )-( 6  ) as follows. In (1 ) replace the private good Ki by the public bad
(externality) “smoke” S,w h e r eS has no subscript (because it is a public bad aﬀecting
everyone simultaneously) and S is not a decision variable for individual i (because it
is involuntarily borne).
(1 ) Ui(xi,z,L i,S) Quasi-concave utility for individual i,i n c r e a s i n gi nxi and z
and decreasing in Li and S
(2 ) x = f(Lx,S) Production private good x,w i t hC R S
(3 ) z = h(Lz) Production public good z,w i t hC R S
Instead of modeling abatement as separable end-of-pipe treatment, which can
7overstate the costs of treatment, in (2 ) we subsume abatement opportunities in the
production function f. “Smoke” is a factor of production in the sense that when pol-
luters pay a price for each unit of emission, they have an incentive to optimize on the
use of smoke in the same way they have an incentive to optimize on labor when they
pay a price for each unit of labor. The model applies to externalities from congestion
and depletion, as well as pollution.6
Corresponding to the capital tax of the baseline model is a (per unit) environmen-
tal tax t collected from the smoke emitting x-industry. Corresponding to i’s marginal





and sum of the marginal beneﬁts ˆ p =

i ˆ pi,





, and sum of the marginal damages
 ˆ ti = ˆ t.
Divide the environmental tax t into two parts, t = ˆ t + τ,w h e r eτ is a surtax,
which is positive or negative depending on whether the environmental tax t is greater
or less than its corrective Pigovian level ˆ t. Deﬁne the Pigovian revenue as ˆ tS and divide
it into two parts. One part, the Pigovian compensation, is earmarked to compensate
the recipients of the environmental harm. We call the remaining part the appropriated
Pigovian revenue. The two decompositions will reveal symmetries between model (1)
- (6) and model (1 )-( 6  ), between the surtax and the labor tax, and between the
appropriated Pigovian revenue and lump-sum taxes.
The appropriated revenue is used to ﬁnance the public good or reduce taxes.
Deﬁne the individual appropriated Pigovian revenue to be αiS,w h e r eαi is a constant
rate of appropriation chosen by the government, and deﬁne the aggregate appropriated
Pigovian revenue to be αS,w h e r e

αi = α. Deﬁne the individual compensation to
each i to be (ˆ ti − αi)S,a n dt h eaggregate Pigovian compensation to be (ˆ t − α)S.B y
construction, the aggregate appropriated Pigovian revenue αS and aggregate Pigovian
6For example, in the problem of highway congestion where each commuter faces a congestion tax,
each commuter has a production function that produces trips with the factors of her time, her car’s
gasoline, oil and capital depreciation, and congestion costs imposed on others, internalized through a
congestion tax.
8compensation (ˆ t − α)S add to the aggregate Pigovian revenue ˆ tS. There can be up-
perbound constraints αi ≤ αi (all i) and an aggregate upperbound constraint α ≤ α.
When α = ˆ t, we say that the Pigovian revenue is fully appropriated.
When compensation is paid, there is the possiblity that individuals will not un-
dertake their eﬃcient defensive or avoidance strategies. For example, when individuals
are compensated for airport noise they may live ineﬃciently close to the airport — the
“coming to the nuisance” problem of concern to Coase (1960). On the other hand,
when compensation is not conditioned on the individuals’ actual actions but on the
estimated harms under eﬃcient defensive strategies, individuals have an incentive to
take their eﬃcient defensive strategies.7 Alternatively, some environmental harms are
pervasive, and individuals have little opportunity for defensive strategies. For exam-
ple, people still carry traces of the long-banned DDT, and there is little they can do
about this widespread pesticide. In the policy discussion, we will focus on the case of
little or no compensation, in which case the issue of “coming to the nuisance” has little
importance. With this in mind, we will use for now the simplifying assumption that
environmental harms are pervasive, with no defensive strategies available.8
The surtax revenue τS is always appropriated by the government to ﬁnance the
public good or reduce other taxes. When τ is negative, the negative surtax revenue is
ﬁnanced by the appropriated Pigovian revenue or by other tax revenues.
We assume two forms of utility. The ﬁrst, a representative agent form, where
Ui(xi,z,L i,S)=U(xi,z,L i,S), is useful to analyze distortionary eﬀects but limited
in analyzing distributional eﬀects. The second, an additively separable form similar
to the one used to study Groves taxes in the mechanism design literature, includes
7Asimilar idea is used in tort law under “comparative negligence” where compensation is paid
not on the amount of actual total damages but on the proportion of the damages attributable to the
defendant. By not being compensated for the amount the plaintiﬀ contributed to the harm by his
actions, the plaintiﬀ is given incentives to undertake eﬃcient defensive or avoidance strategies.
8As a background assumption, we assume that in his judgment individual i’s actions negligibly
aﬀect the aggregate S and his ˆ ti (with pervasive S). These assumptions parallel the assumption that
i’s actions negligibly aﬀect the price Px.
9more distributional eﬀects. In this second form, deﬁne i’s utility, with a slight abuse
of notation, as Ui(xi,z,S) − Li (see Green and Laﬀont, pp. 29-32, 1980).9
We consider only internal equilibria with non-negativity constraints Li,x,z,S≥ 0
non-binding, and environmental taxes as the only instruments of environmental regu-
lation.10 Besides the market clearing equations, the Walrasian equilibrium conditions
come from:
(4 )M a x Ui(xi,z,L i,S) subject to Pxxi = wLi +( ˆ ti − αi)S − Mi (each i)
xi,L i
(5 )M a x Pxf(Lx,S) − (w + v)Lx − (ˆ t + τ)S
Lx,S
(6 ) wLz = αS + τS+ vLx + M
where in (4 ), (ˆ ti − αi) is individual i’s rate of compensation, and S is not a decision
variable in for i.I n ( 6  ) expenditures wLz on z equal the revenue sources of the
appropriated Pigovian revenue, the surtax revenue, revenue from the tax on labor in
the x-industry and the lump-sum revenue M where

Mi = M. The following examples
illustrate model (1 )-( 6  ).
Example 1 (αi = ˆ ti,M i =0a l li,a n dτ and v unconstrained). This is
a simpliﬁed case of the recent literature.11 With αi = ˆ ti (all i), no individual gets a
compensation payment. With α = ˆ t the Pigovian revenue is fully appropriated by the
9Espinosa and Smith (2002) found that computable general equilibrium estimates of second-best
taxes can vary sensitively with separability speciﬁcations. The theorems and corollaries below are
suﬃciently general to hold for both speciﬁcations of utility, one with no separability assumptions and
the other with a strong assumption of separability.
10With modiﬁcation, the theorems and corollaries carry over to situations where there are other
regulatory controls. For example, auctioned marketable permits are similar to environmental taxes
with αi = ˆ ti; “grandfathered” marketable permits are similar to environmental taxes with the environ-
mental revenue returned to the producers; optimized command-and-control is similar to grandfathered
marketable permits with no gains from permit trading. The parallel between environmental taxes and
auctioned marketable allowances abstracts from diﬀerences in uncertainty.
11The simpliﬁed case lacks a second “clean” good but doesn’t require revenue neutrality. See Page
and Zhang (2000) for an added second private good, extending (1 )-( 6  ) to include models by Goulder
et al. (1999), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Parry (1995), but needing additional adjustments
to deal with linearity assumptions in the latter two models.
10government, and this revenue added to the surtax revenue is αS +τS = ˆ tS +τS = tS,
so the entire environmental tax revenue is appropriated by the government as general
revenue. The environmental tax is unconstrained because τ is unconstrained.
Example 2 (αi = Mi =0a l li, τ =0 ,a n dv unconstrained). This is an
early case in the environmental economics literature. In this case, the environmental
tax t equals its corrective Pigovian level t = ˆ t and the Pigovian revenue is returned on
a marginal damage basis as compensation to the harm recipients.
The corrective Pigovian taxes of this case are similar to Lindahl prices (or taxes),
except that Pigovian taxes are applied to public bads, Lindahl taxes to public goods.
Individual Lindahl taxes, set at ˆ pi, are marginal beneﬁt taxes and the aggregate tax ˆ p
ﬁnances the public good, while the individual Pigovian ˆ ti are marginal damage com-
pensation rates and the aggregate environmental tax t = ˆ t controls the public bad.
Together, they achieve ﬁrst-best eﬃciency.
Both individual Lindahl marginal beneﬁt taxes ˆ pi and individual Pigovian mar-
ginal damage compensation rates ˆ ti are useful analytic tools. Both are impractical.
Both are set aside when it comes to practical policy application. Yet, providing the
eﬃcient amount of the public good requires estimating the aggregate ˆ p, and controlling
public bads to eﬃcient levels requires estimating the aggregate ˆ t. Fortunately, both ˆ p
and ˆ t can be estimated with less relative error than estimating the individual ˆ pi and ˆ ti.
Example 3 (αi = ˆ ti,M i =0a l li, τ = −ˆ t and v unconstrained). This
case models non-regulation. The environmental tax facing the polluters is t = ˆ t + τ =
ˆ t − ˆ t = 0, so the polluters are unregulated. The fully appropriated Pigovian revenue
ˆ tS is completely used up ﬁnancing the negative surtax revenue (−ˆ tS)s ot h a tt h e r ei s
no net environmental revenue obtained by the government. And with αi = ˆ ti (all i)n o
one is compensated for environmental harms.
Theorem 1 corresponds to Observation 2 and identiﬁes τ as a distortionary tax.
Theorem 1. First-order conditions for second-best labor and environmental





=( ˆ phL − 1)dLz + τdS+ vdLx =0
(13) dLz = d(αS)+d(τS)+d(vLx).
Proof. See Appendix for (12); (13) is the diﬀerential of (6 )w i t hﬁ x e dM.
The proof in the Appendix closely follows the proof of Observation 2, with dif-
ferences underlined. The restrictions of αi = αj,M i = Mj, which preserve a world
of equals, are needed for the proof with the representative agent utilities but not for
additively separable utility. When α = 0, the ﬁrst-order conditions of Theorem 1 sat-
isfy a permutation symmetry, as in Observations 1 and 2. Exchanging v for τ,a n d
exchanging Lx for S, leaves the form of the ﬁrst-order conditions the same. When
α  = 0 the symmetry still goes through in (12), but is broken in (13). Summarizing,
Corollary 1. In a second-best equilibrium there is a permutation symmetry
between the environmental surtax and the labor tax if and only if α =0 .
In the usual case when αi ≥ 0( a l li), α = 0 implies αi =0( a l li), in which case
there is full Pigovian marginal damage compensation. The labor tax v is a Ramsey
tax, and when α = 0 the environmental surtax τ, with its permutation symmetry,
behaves like a Ramsey tax too. Behaving like a Ramsey tax when α = 0, second-
best τ is typically positive but can be negative because of complementarities.12 When
α  =0 , condition (12) remains the same and τ is still a distortionary tax but no longer
12Most of the studies so far have assumed separability conditions which tend to weaken comple-
mentarities and suggest that, in at least the models, when α = 0 second-best τ will be less frequently
negative than other second-best proportional taxes. But with little known about actual complemen-
tarities, it is hard to say how typical is typical. In two models we were able to solve analytically, with
a revenue need second-best τ was always positive when α = 0 and often but not always negative when
α = ˆ t (see Page and Zhang, 2000, pp. 14-20 for one of the models).
12exchanges roles with v, because of the extra source of the appropriated Pigovian revenue
d(αS)i n( 1 3) . W h e n α = ˆ t>0, the main case of the recent literature, it has been
found that second-best τ is often negative.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 illustrates the symmetry. Panel (i) is the standard diagram for a pro-
portional labor tax collected from the producers, where market forces equilibrate the
after-tax price of labor to the producers with the producers’ marginal revenue product
from labor, and equilibrate the after-tax price of labor to the laborers with the laborers’
marginal cost of working. In panel (ii) there is a market failure from the externality.
At a market forces still equilibrate the after-tax price of smoke to the producer with
the producers’ marginal revenue product from smoke (the producers balance the cost
of abatement with the cost of the environmental tax t = ˆ t + τ). But at b there are
no market forces to equilibrate the sum of the marginal damages of smoke to smoke
recipients with their aggregate rate of compensation. However, when the government
imposes the environmental tax and pays Pigovian marginal damage compensation, the
government in eﬀect privatizes the externality. Intuitively, Pigovian compensation ˆ tS
corresponds to the wage bill wLx; ˆ t to the wage w;a n dτ to the Ramsey tax v.13
Theorem 2 extends Observation 3to include externalities and reveals a parallel
between the appropriated Pigovian revenue and lump-sum taxes. Write λ1 and λ2
for the shadow prices for M and α respectively, and V
I M(M)a n dVα(α) for the value
functions.
Theorem 2 (Appropriation of the Pigovian Revenue). First-order conditions
for second-best M and α are
(14) either (M ≤ M and λ1 =0 ) or (M = M and λ1 > 0)
13But α does not correspond to a proportional tax, say β, collected at the labor level. The two
labor taxes v and β reduce to an equivalent single labor tax v  = v + β. In contrast α and τ do not
reduce to a single tax τ  = τ + α.
13(15) either (α ≤ α and λ2 =0 ) or (α = α and λ2 > 0)
(16) Sλ1 = λ2
(17) V
I M(M)=λ1 and Vα(α)=λ2
Proof. See Appendix.
Conditions (14) and (15) are slack complementarity conditions for the upper-
bound constraints M ≤ M and α ≤ α respectively, and (16) shows the connection
between the two. With interior S>0, condition (16) says that either both upperbound
constrants are strictly binding (λ1 > 0a n dλ2 > 0) or neither are (λ1 = λ2 =0 ) .A s
before, there is a revenue need when (λ1 > 0) and M is strictly binding. As long as
λ1 > 0 (implying λ2 > 0 as well), both M and α increase until they hit their up-
perbound constraints by (14) and (15). When there is no revenue need and λ1 =0
(implying λ2 = 0), then either M or α or both can be less than their upperbound
constraints.
Consider ﬁrst the case when both λ1 and λ2 are zero. In this case an increase in
M or α does not increase second-best NSB because there is already ﬁrst-best eﬃciency
and no revenue need.
Consider next the more likely case when λ1 > 0a n dλ2 > 0, when there is a
revenue need. By (14) a $1 increase in M increases lump-sum revenue by $1. By (17)
this $1 increase in M increases NSB by λ1. By (15) a $1/S increase in α increases
the rate of appropriation α by $1/S and thus the appropriated Pigovian revenue by
(S)($1/S) = $1. By (17), the $1/S increase in α increases NSB by λ2/S. By (16)
λ2/S = λ1, so the $1/S increase in α increases NSB b yt h es a m ea m o u n ta st h e$ 1
increase in M.
The two sources of incremental revenue satisfy an equivalence property for mar-
ginal changes in a second-best equilibrium, when there is a revenue need. A $1/S
increase in α can subsititued for a $1 increase in M with taxes τ and v held constant,
14and there is the same increase in revenue and the same increase in NSB.14
We develop a variation of this idea, applied to more-than-incremental changes
and to Walrasian equilibria rather than to only second-best equilibria. Omitting the
qualiﬁer “all i” when it is clear by context, we will say that in two Walrasian equilibria
the appropriated Pigovian revenues αiS exchange for lump-sum taxes Mi if the ap-
propriated Pigovian revenues in the ﬁrst equilibrium equal in amounts the lump-sum
taxes in the second equilibrium, there are no lump-sum taxes in the ﬁrst equilibrium
and no appropriated Pigovian revenues in the second, and other taxes τ and v are the
same in both equilibria. See the note15 for the deﬁnition in the other direction.
Consider two sets A and B of the utility relevant part Walrasian equilibria (the
equilibrium values of (x1,...,xn,z,L 1,...,Ln,S), where n is the number of individuals).
In Set A, choose αi
  and constrain the rates of appropriation αi to αi = αi
 ,a n d
constrain lump-sum taxes Mi to zero (constrain Mi to Mi
  = 0). In Set B, choose Mi
  
and constrain the Mi to Mi = Mi
  , and constrain αi to 0.
We deﬁne an exchange as an equivalent exchange if the two equilibria in the
exchange have the same utility relevant values of (x1,...,xn,z,L 1,...,Ln,S).
Theorem 3 (Equivalence). For every interior Walrasian equilibrium with appro-
priated Pigovian but no lump-sum taxes, the appropriated Pigovian revenue exchanges
equivalently for lump-sum taxes in another Walrasian equilibrium with lump-sum taxes
but no appropriated Pigovian revenue, and vice-versa.
Proof. Starting from Set A, choose any admissible taxes (τ,v) and constraints
(αi = αi
 ,M i = 0) and write the associated Walrasian equilibrium utility relevant
14In contrast, incremental changes in an unconstrained proportional labor tax v and a lump-sum
tax M do not satisfy this property. If v can be incrementally adjusted so it has the same revenue
eﬀect as a $1 increase in M, the change in v still leaves NSB constant while the change in M increases
NSB.
15We say lump-sum taxes Mi exchange for appropriated Pigovian revenues αiS if the the lump-sum
taxes in the ﬁrst equilibrium equal in amounts to the appropriated Pigovian revenues in the second
equilibrium, there are no appropriated Pigovian revenues in the ﬁrst equilibrium and no lump-sum
taxes in the second, and other taxes τ and v are the same in both equilibria.
15values as (x1
 ...,xn
 ,z ,L 1
 ,...,Ln
 ,S ), or if there are multiple equilibria pick any one
of them and write its utility relevant values (x1
 ...,xn
 ,z ,L 1
 ,...,Ln
 ,S ).
The ﬁrst-order conditions (A1 ), (A2 ), and (A3 ) in the Appendix for this equi-
librium are same as for an equilibrium in Set B with the same taxes (τ,v) and corre-
sponding constraints (αi =0 ,M i
   = αi
 S ). So we can ﬁnd an equilibrium in Set B
with the same (x1
 ...,xn
 ,z ,L 1
 ,...,Ln
 ,S ), if each i’s wealth is the same in the two
equilibria and the government revenue from M   in (6 ) in Set B is the same amount as
the government revenue from αi
 S  in Set A. These last two conditions are met by the
choice of constraints in Set B, (αi =0 ,M i
   = αi
 S ).
The Pigovian revenues exchange for lump-sum taxes because Mi
   = αi
 S  and
the taxes (τ,v) are the same in both equilibria. The exchange is equivalent because
the two equilibria have the same utility relevant values (x1
 ...,xn
 ,z ,L 1
 ,...,Ln
 ,S ).
Making the exchange the other way, choose any admissible taxes (τ,v) and con-
straints (αi =0 ,M i = Mi
  ) in Set B and write its associated Walrasian equilibrium as
(x1
  ,...,xn
  ,z  ,L 1
  ,...,Ln
  ,S  ), or if there are multiple equilibria pick any one of the
multiple equilibria and write its utility relevant values (x1
  ,...,xn
  ,z  ,L 1
  ,...,Ln
  ,S  ).
The rest of the argument follows correspondingly to that for the ﬁrst exchange.
Because an equivalent exchange between appropriated Pigovian revenues and
lump-sum taxes leads to Walrasian equilibria with the same values of the utility rele-
vant variables, the distortionary and distributional eﬀects of the appropriated Pigovian
revenues are the same as the exchange equivalent lump-sum taxes.16
[Figure 3about here]
Cases 1 - 3of Figure 3illustrate equivalent distortionary and distributional ef-
16The complication of possible multiple equilibria is of course a problem not limited to the analysis
of environmental taxes. It helps, though, that in Theorem 3 the matching of ﬁrst-order conditions
leads to a matching of multiple equilibria when there are multiple equilibria. Further restrictions, for
example, Ui = xα
i (E/S)1−α +e(z)−Li and f(Lx,S)=Lb
xS(1−b)f o r0<a ,b<1, positive constant
E, and concave e, provides uniqueness when there is a Walrasian equilibrium.
16fects. Starting with Case 1, with constraints αi = α = 0 and without lump-sum
taxes or appropriated Pigovian revenues, relax the constraints on lump-sum taxes to
Mi
   > 0 in Case 2, where for later use Mi
   is chosen to equal the Pigovian compen-
sation (ˆ t − α)S  = ˆ tS . Move from Case 2 to Case 3by an equivalent exchange of
lump-sum taxes for appropriated Pigovian revenues. The distortionary and distribu-
tional eﬀects of moving from Case 1 to Case 2 are the same as in moving from Case 1 to
Case 3, because Cases 2 and 3 have the same values of their utility relevant variables.
The ﬁrst part of Corollary 2 follows from Theorem 3.
Corollary 2 (Extension of Sandmo’s Observation). In each interior Walrasian
equilibrium, appropriated Pigovian revenues without lump-sum taxes exchange equiva-
lently for lump-sum taxes without appropriated Pigovian revenues, and in the exchange
the appropriated Pigovian revenues have the same non-distortionary and distributional
eﬀects as the lump-sum taxes; and in the special case when the fully appropriated Pigov-
ian revenues, without lump-sum taxes, equal the revenue need and are used to meet it,
there is ﬁrst-best eﬃciency with other taxes set at zero.
The special case is Sandmo’s original observation, with distortionary costs in the
tax system.
Finally, to compare second-best eﬃciencies, write WEA(τ,v|αi = αi
 ,M i =0 )f o r
the Walrasian equilibrium associated with the choice of constaints (αi = αi
 ,M i =0 )
in Set A and taxes (τ,v), and if there are multiple equilibria pick the one with the
highest NSB for this mapping. Write WEB(τ,v|αi =0 ,M i = Mi
  ) for the Walrasian
equilibrium associated with the choice of constaints (αi =0 ,M i = Mi
  )i nS e tBa n d
taxes (τ,v), and if there are multiple equilibria pick the one with the highest NSB for
this mapping. It follows from the proof of Theorem 3that for the same taxes ( τ,v)
(18) WE
B(τ,v|αi =0 ,M i = Mi
  )=( x1
  ,...,xn
  ,z














S ,M i =0 ) .
17Modify (18) to (18 ) by adding the extra constraint S  = S   on the right side of the
equation:
(18 ) WE





S ,M i =0 ,S
  = S
  ),
where this extra constraint is satisﬁed in Theorem 3, and consider the following steps.
First, on the left side of (18 ) maximize NSB over (τ,v) to ﬁnd the second-best
Walrasian equilibrium for the constraints (αi =0 ,M i = Mi
  ). For the same values
of (τ,v) on the right side, the lump-sum taxes exchange equivalently for appropriated
Pigovian revenues. With the same utility relevant variables in the two equilibria, the
NSB are the same in the two equilibria. Second, on the right side (18 ) maximize
the NSB over (τ,v) for the constraints (αi =
Mi

S ,M i =0 ,S  = S  ). This second
NSB cannot decrease and may increase. The extra constraint S  = S   insures that
the individual Mi’s equal in the ﬁrst step equal the individual appropriated Pigovian
revenues in the second step, and the aggregate lump-sum revenue of the ﬁrst step equals
the aggregate appropriated Pigovian revenue in the second-step. Summarizing,
Corollary 3 (Second-Best Eﬃciency). The second-best eﬃciency of the tax sys-
tem with admissible lump sum taxes Mi but no admissible appropriated Pigovian rev-
enues is no higher than the second-best eﬃciency of the tax system with admissible
appropriated Pigovian revenues αiS equal in amount to Mi but no admissible lump-
sum taxes, where the amounts of S are held constant by constraint.
III. Tax Interaction Eﬀects
Consider ﬁrst the case of second-best tax interaction eﬀects with revenue neutral-
ity and ﬁxed M and α. With revenue neutrality, dG = d(wLz) = 0, and (12) reduces
to
d(NSB)
−UL = τdS+ vdLx = 0. Use the implicit function theorem to write second-best



















∂τdτ and v ∂Lx
∂v dv, are “own-price” marginal tax interaction eﬀects, and τ ∂S
∂vdv
and v ∂Lx
∂τ dτ are “cross-price” marginal tax interaction eﬀects.
The ﬁnding of second-best environmental tax typically less than its Pigovian
level (second-best τ<0) in the recent literature assumes revenue neutrality and fully
appropriated Pigovian revenue (α = ˆ t by constraint). In this case when second-best
τ<0, the own-price eﬀect τ ∂S
∂τdτ of an incremental increase in τ on S is a marginal
beneﬁt, because τ<0, ∂S
∂τ < 0, and dτ > 0. So all the other marginal distortionary
costs in (19) must add to an increase in distortionary cost, for the total of all the eﬀects
to add to zero. In other words in this case an incremental increase in environmental
taxes “exacerbates” the distortionary costs of other taxes.
Goulder (p. 402, 2000) and Parry (p. S-65, 1995) explain their ﬁnding of second-
best τ<0 in terms of the cross-price interaction eﬀect of the environmental tax in
exacerbating the distortionary costs of other taxes. But as we saw in Section I, in a
second-best equilibrium without externalities, a decrease in the distortionary cost of
one tax exacerbates the distortionary costs of the remaining taxes, yet this cross-price
eﬀect is not enough to make these ordinary (Ramsey) taxes typically negative.
With environmental taxes, the own-price eﬀect of τ on the appropriated Pigovian
revenue appears to be a more determining factor. In a second-best equilibrium when
there is a revenue need and strictly binding constraints on α and M, dM must be
non-positive. But when α is positive and the constraint α ≤ α is strictly binding, there
is an additional revenue opportunity for d(αS). When τ is unconstrained, it is possible
to decrease τ and through its own-price eﬀect increase S so d(αS)c a nb ep o s i t i v e .( I t
is for this reason that the additional constraint S  = S   was added in Corollary 3.) The
importance of the own-price eﬀect of τ on the appropriated Pigovian revenue αS can
be seen by ruling it out. Constrain α = 0, so the appropriated Pigovian revenue is zero
whatever the value of τ.W i t hα = 0 we are back in the symmetry case of Corollary 1
with second-best τ typically positive.
19The eﬀect of the upperbound constraint on α is further revealed by relaxing α
altogether, allowing α>ˆ t. Then, by Theorem 2, we get ﬁrst-best eﬃciency, in which
case second-best τ = v =0 .
IV. Policy
There are several policy goals in setting environmental and other taxes, including:
• reducing environmental harms
• reducing distortionary costs
• limiting adverse distributional eﬀects associated with lump-sum taxes
Reducing environmental harms is the speciﬁc mission goal of the Environmental
Protection Agency in much the same way that limiting inﬂation was a mission goal of
the Council on Wage and Price stability or military capability is a mission goal of the
Department of Defense. In this paper, the direct beneﬁt of reducing the environmental
harm by increasing τ when τ<0 is interpreted as the same as reducing the own-price
distortionary cost of smoke, and in this way the ﬁrst two goals are related. The last
two goals are also related in the well-known tradeoﬀ between distortionary costs and
distribution associated with the use of lump-sum taxes.
A basic policy question is how to balance the three goals. In principle, the policy
tradeoﬀ in the use of lump-sum taxes depends on how adverse are the distributional
eﬀects associated with their use. For example in a world of equals there are no adverse
distributional eﬀects from lump-sum taxes and little apparent reason to limit lump-
sum taxes besides administrative diﬃculties. But in the practical, heterogeneous world,
priority in the tradeoﬀ is so strongly in favor of reducing lump-sum distributional eﬀects
that lump-sum sources are standardly ruled out altogether and Mi is constrained to
zero for all i, in applied policy as well as in second-best analysis.
But what about the lump-sum equivalent eﬀects of αiS? These have the same
adverse distributional eﬀects as their equivalent Mi. If we rule out the ordinary Mi
shouldn’t we rule out the equivalent Mi by constraining αiS = 0? But constraining
20αiS =0( a l li) means requiring individual marginal damage compensation, which as
noted earlier can only be roughly estimated and implemented.
Nonetheless, in a heterogeneous world there can be important adverse distrib-
utional eﬀects from environmental harms when there is no compensation (when the
Pigovian revenue is fully appropriated) or when the appropriated Pigovian revenue
is augmented by decreasing the environmental tax and increasing the environmental
harm. Those more vulnerable to the enviromental harms, for example those with
asthma or compromised immune systems, have higher marginal damages (higher ˆ ti),
and bear disproportionately higher burdens.
There are three main ways of limiting or reducing adverse distributional eﬀects
associated with the appropriated Pigovian revenue αS: reduce the aggregate appro-
priation rate α, reduce the environmental harm S, or target limited compensation on
the most vulnerable. Some targeted compensation is done, for example, by compensat-
ing for black lung disease, but full implementation of marginal damage compensation
remains impractical.
Given a choice between compensation for the harm and reduction of the harm
itself, environmental legislation has shown a preference toward reductions of the harm,
as a way of protecting the vulnerable. Compensation has received little attention in
legislative mandates and regulation, while harm reduction has received much attention.
As a practical matter, with little political demand for marginal damage compensation,
and little compensation actually paid, the “coming to the nuisance” problem disap-
pears, and the assumption of pervasive harm is no longer needed.
Cases 1 - 5 of Figure 3illustrate a range of policy tradeoﬀs with diﬀering con-
straints and a revenue need. Case 4 (the recent literature) is the same as Example
1, and Case 5 (non-regulation) is the same as Example 3. Of the ﬁve cases, Case 5,
with t = ˆ t − τ = ˆ t − ˆ t = 0, has typically the lowest environmental tax, the highest S,
and the largest appropriated Pigovian revenue and lump-sum equivalent distributional
21eﬀects (but the direct beneﬁt of the non-distortionary Pigovian revenue is entirely
used up in oﬀsetting the environmental tax). Compared with Case 5, Case 4, with
unconstrained second-best τ usually negative but not so negative as −ˆ t,h a sah i g h e r
NSB (by relaxing the constraint on τ), and with the higher environmental tax it has a
lower S and smaller lump-sum equivalent distributional eﬀects – a triple dividend over
non-regulation (when second-best τ>−ˆ t).
Case 2, with αi = α = 0, has unconstrained τ usually positive (by Corollary 1),
with τ the same in Case 3by the equivalent exchange. Compared with Case 4, τ is
higher in Cases 2 and 3, S is lower, the lump-sum (or equivalent) eﬀects are less, and
the NSB is lower (by the more binding constraints on τ and v in Case 3). Case 1 is the
only case without either lump-sum or lump-sum equivalent distributional eﬀects. This
case also has the likely highest τ (with lump-sum taxes meeting part of the revenue
need, second-best τ and v are likely lower in Case 2 than Case 1), but in Case 1 the
NSB is lower than in Cases 2 and 3(by Theorem 2).
Not shown in Figure 3is the case of traditional cost-beneﬁt analysis, which is
the same as Case 3, except that τ is contrained to τ = 0 (the environmental tax is set
equal to the sum of the marginal damages, its Pigovian revenue is fully appropriated,
and there are no lump-sum taxes). The constrained τ = 0 is less than the likely
positive τ of Case 3, and more than the likely negative τ of Case 4, with S, NSB and
appropriated Pigovian revenue likely intermediate between Cases 3and 4. We label
this intermediate cost-beneﬁt case Case 3a.
Table 1 about here
The six cases oﬀer variations of the standard tradeoﬀ between distortionary costs
and distributional eﬀects associated with lump-sum taxes. Table 1 summarizes the
direction of changes in the tradeoﬀ for the policy goals, comparing each case with the
next. The table abstracts from the costs and practicality of implementation, and Cases
3, 3A, and 4, which do not require individual marginal damage compensation, are more
22practical than the other regulatory cases. Moreover, the rankings are rough because
we use the amount of the appropriated Pigovian revenue or the amount of lump-sum
taxes as proxies of direction toward or away from the third goal.17
Besides the main results identifying distortionary and distributional eﬀects of en-
vironmental taxes, a more general policy idea emerges from the analysis. With the large
opportunity to raise non-distortionary revenue by appropriating the Pigovian revenue
and with the diﬃculty in implementing Pigovian compensation there is considerable
room to make policy tradeoﬀs. The well-known compromise struck in implementing
the Title IV SO2 program is an example. Environmentalists who participated in the
markup of the bill preferred a sharp, almost 50% reduction in SO2 emissions to compen-
sation for existing pollution; polluters were willing to abate substantially in exchange
for getting most of the appropriated Pigovian revenue in the form of grandfathered
marketable allowances earmarked for them; and the government was willing to transfer
almost all the appropriated Pigovian revenue to the polluters (96.5% or more of the
allowances are grandfathered) in exchange for a dramatically successful program.18
17When individual lump-sum taxes are imposed at the same amount for each individual, the dis-
proportionate burden falls on the poor; when individual rates of appropriated Pigovian revenue are
set equal to the individual marginal damages, as they are with fully appropriated Pigovian revenues,
the disproportonate burden falls on those with the highest marginal damages, the most vulnerable.
18Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) recommend a compromise for controlling the greenhouse gas CO2
but with about 90% of the appropriated Pigovian revenue retained as general revenue, and probably
with taxes rather than allowances as the instrument.
23Appendix
P r o o fo ft h eM a i nP a r to fO b s e r v a t i o n1
Step (i). Fix the taxes γ and v, recall w = 1, ﬁx a candidate price Px and rental
rate r, from (4) form the Lagrangian Li = Ui(xi,z,L i,K−Ki)−λi(Pxxi−Li−rKi−Mi),
write ∂Li
∂xi = Ui
x − λiPx =0 , ∂Li
∂Ki = −Ui
K + λir =0 ,a n d∂Li
∂Li = Ui
L − λi =0 ,a n dw r i t e










(A2) PxfL(Lx,K x) − 1=v, and PxfK(Lx,K x) − r = γ
Step (ii). Adjust the candidate Px and r to solve the market-clearing equations




Ki, and x =

xi
Step (iii). For representatinve agent utilities NSB =

i Ui(xi,z,L i,K −Ki)=

















dz − dLi − rdKi)( b y Ui
L = U
j













= Pxdx +ˆ pdz −

dLi − rdKx (by deﬁnition of ˆ p and by (A3))
= Px(fLdLx + fKdKx)+ˆ phLdLz − (dLx + dLz) − rdKx (by (2), (3), (A3))
=( PxfL − 1)dLx +( PxfK − r)dKx +(ˆ phL − 1)dLz
(A4)
d(NSB)
−UL =( ˆ phL − 1)dLz + γdKx + vdLx (by (A2)).
24Proof of Observation 3
We maximize NSB =

Ui(xi,z,L i,K − Ki) subject to the upperbound con-
straint on M, the constraints (A1), (A2), (A3), the government’s budget constraint (6),
and the sum of the individuals’ budget constraints from (4). Form the Lagrangian:
L =

Ui(xi,z,L i,K − Ki) − λ1(M − M) − λ2(PxfL − 1 − v) − λ3(PxfK − r − γ)
− λ4(Ux + ULPx) − λ5(UK + ULr)
− λ6(Lx + Lz −

Li) − λ7(Kx + K) − λ8(f(Lx,K x) −

xi)
− λ9(z − h(Lz)) − λ10(Lz − γKx − vLx − M)









∂M = λ1. By the direction of the inequality constraint M ≤ M,
we know λ1 ≥ 0. So for a second-best equilibrium λ1 must either be zero with the
constraint M ≤ M weakly binding or λ1 > 0 with the the constraint M ≤ M strictly
binding, as in (13).
25Proof of the Main Part of Theorem 1
Fix τ,v and α, and ﬁx the candidate Px and ˆ t. Form the Lagrangian for (4 )
Li = Ui(xi,z,L i,S)−λi(Pxxi−Li−(ˆ ti−αi)S−Mi), and write the ﬁrst-order conditions




(A2 ) PxfL(Lx,S) − 1=v and PxfS(Lx,S) − ˆ t = τ,
where by the market failure there is no FOC corresponding to −Ui
K/Ui
L = r in (A1 ).
Adjust the candidate Px and ˆ t to solve the market-clearing equations
(A3 ) Lx +Lz =

Li, and x =



























dz − dLi −
Ui
S
ULdS)( b y Ui
L = U
j















= Pxdx +ˆ pdz −

dLi − ˆ tdS (by deﬁnitions ˆ p and ˆ t and (A3 ))
= Px(fLdLx + fSdS)+ˆ phLdLz − (dLx + dLz) − ˆ tdS (by (2 ), (3 ), (A3 ))
=( PxfL − 1)dLx +( PxfS − ˆ t)dS +(ˆ phL − 1)dLz
(A4 )
d(NSB)
−UL =( ˆ phL−1)dLz+τdS+vdLx (by (A2 ))
Set
d(NSB)
−UL = 0 as a necessary condition for a second-best equilibrium.
For the case of additive separability, (A1 )-( A 3  ) are the same. The NSB =






SdS − dLi). With Ui
L = −1,
the rest of the proof follows as above.
26Proof of Theorem 2
Write i’s utility as Ui(xi,z,L i,S), for either its representative agent or additively
separable form. We maximize NSB =

Ui subject to the upperbound constraints on
M and α, the constraints (A1 ), (A2 ), (A3 ), the government’s budget constraint (8 ),
and the sum of the individuals’ budget constraints. Form the Lagrangian, underlining
diﬀerences with Observation 3:
L =

Ui(xi,z,L i,S) − λ1(M − M) − λ2(α − α) − λ3(PxfL − 1 − v)





xi) − λ8(z − h(Lz)) − λ9(Lz − αS − τS− vLx − M)
− λ10(Pxx − w

Li − ˆ tS + αS + M)




∂M = λ1 and Vα(α)=
∂L
∂α = λ2. By the direction of the inequality constraint
α ≤ α,w ek n o wλ2 ≥ 0. So for a second-best equilibrium λ2 must either be zero or the
constraint α ≤ α must be strictly binding, and (15) follows. Condition (14) follows as
in the proof of Observation 3.
For (16), note that in the second-best equilibrium,
∂L
∂α
= −λ2 + λ9S − λ10S = −λ2 + S(λ9 − λ10)=0 a n d
∂L
∂M
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